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IMPLEMENTING BROWN: A LAWYER'S VIEW
ROBERT A. SEDLERt
At its core, Brown v. Board of Education' was not a case about
racially integrated schools or even about education. At its core, Brown was
a case about dismantling the system of state-imposed racial segregation in
the American south; a system that inflicted daily humiliation upon African-
American citizens and relegated them to a condition of societal
subordination and, inequality. ' Brown was the culmination of a quarter-
century effort by the NAACP to overturn the separate but equal doctrine
of Plessy v. Ferguson3 and the legal structure of state-imposed racial
segregation that followed in its wake. The strategy was "top-down," starting
with the graduate school level, where the glaring disparities of separate but
equal were most apparent, working down to the college level, and from
there to primary and secondary education. Once the Supreme Court
declared that it was unconstitutional for the states to maintain racially
separate public schools, it was believed by the NAACP legal strategists that
it would logically follow that the rest of the state-imposed segregation would
fall of its own force.4
I Distinguished Professor of Law and Gibbs Chair in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, University of Pittsburgh; J.D., 1959, University of
Pittsburgh.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See Edmund Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 159 (1955) ("[Olne
speaks in terms of the most familiar and universally accepted standards of right and wrong
when one remarks (1) that racial segregation under government auspices inevitably inflicts
humiliation, and (2) that official humiliation of innocent, law-abiding citizens is
psychologically injurious and morally evil.").
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See generally CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A
LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (Oxford University Press 1987); Paul Oberst, The
Strange Career of Plessy v. Ferguson, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 389 (1973).
4. See infra notes 11-15 and accompanyingtext (supportingthe accuracy of this belief).
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Richard Kluger's book, Simple Justice,5 details this struggle and
demonstrates the very careful lawyering that went into it. The NAACP
lawyers, led by Thurgood Marshall, litigating in what were often very hostile
and difficult venues, developed very powerful legal arguments and
surmounted numerous procedural hurdles in order to get Brown and earlier
cases before the Supreme Court. As I wrote in a book review of Simple
Justice in 1976:
What stands out most clearly from these portrayals is the very
careful "lawyering" that went into the segregation cases, and the
author demonstrates most cogently how legal victories in the
struggle for social change are achieved not by oratorical bombast
or by railing against injustice, no matter how patent it may be, but
by utilizing the lawyer's skills to make the legal process responsive
to the claim of injustice.6
The first case in the progression was Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada,7 decided in 1938. Many southern states did not provide law
schools or medical schools or other graduate schools for African-
Americans, opting instead to pay their tuition at schools in other states. The
Supreme Court held that "separate but equal" meant that the separate
school had to be provided in the same state where one was provided for
whites! Then came Sweatt v. Painter,9 decided in 1950, where the Court
held that "separate but equal" could not apply to law schools and graduate
schools, because it was necessary for African-American students to
interact with white students during professional and graduate training. °
These cases set the stage for Brown and its holding that segregation in the
5. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1975).
6. Robert A. Sedler, Booksfor Lawyers, 62 A.B.A. J. 1092, 1092 (1976) (book review).
7. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
8. Id. at 351-52.
9. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
10. Id. at 634-36. See also McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339
U.S. 637, 640-42 (1950) (holding unconstitutional a state university's efforts to internally
segregate an African-American graduate student by requiring him to sit at a separate desk
outside of the classroom, a separate desk outside the library reading room, and a separate
table in the cafeteria).
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public schools was "inherently unequal," and therefore unconstitutional. I
Armed with the Brown precedent, the NAACP lawyers went back to
court to complete the overriding objective of fully dismantling the legal
structure of state-imposed segregation. In the years after Brown, the
Supreme Court, in a series of per curium opinions, citing only Brown, held
unconstitutional state-imposed segregation in all public facilities and
activities, such as transportation, 2 parks, 3 and athletic competition. 4 The
process culminated in the most aptly-named case in constitutional law,
Loving v. Virginia,'5 where the Court struck down state laws prohibiting
interracial marriage. From a constitutional standpoint, the legal structure of
state-imposed segregation had come to an ignominious end.
At the same time, it must be remembered that Brown itself involved
state-imposed segregation in the public school systems of seventeen
southern and border states. Implementation of that part of Brown involved
many years of arduous and frustrating litigation by NAACP and other civil
rights lawyers. Cases had to be brought in every school system in these
states, and the desegregation effort met with what those states proudly
called "massive resistance." My own introduction to civil rights litigation
began when I was a young assistant professor at St. Louis University in
1962. I was a volunteer lawyer for the NAACP in a school desegregation
case in Charleston, Missouri, along with a more experienced African-
American lawyer who was later to become a federal judge.' 6 Because this
11. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. The cases prior to Brown culminated in the Supreme
Court's holding in Brown that:
[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of'separatebut equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought
are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 495. See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499-500 (1954) (holdingthat federally-
required segregation of the District of Columbia schools constituted "discrimination. . . so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process," and consequently violated the "equal
protection" component of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause).
12. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
13. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Muir
v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n., 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
14. State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959).
15. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. The more experienced African-American lawyer, Clyde S. Cahill, was appointed
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was a relatively small school system, the school board was unable to obtain
any delay, and we succeeded in getting the court to order implementation
of a desegregation plan at the start of the 1963 school year. 7 In most
school districts unfortunately, the process was much more drawn out. But,
by the end of the decade, desegregation had been accomplished in most
rural and smaller school districts in the South. This meant that white parents
wanting to avoid desegregation in those districts had to form "white only"
private schools, as some of them did. 8
The situation in larger urban and consolidated districts was more
complex. In southern cities, as in northern ones, there was a high degree of
residential racial segregation, which continues to this day. Since school
attendance zones were drawn according to geographic attendance zoning,
many schools, particularly at the elementary level, would in fact have been
factually segregated, even in the absence of state-imposed segregation. The
school districts argued that they satisfied the obligation to convert from a
dual system to a unitary one by substituting geographic attendance zoning
for race as the basis of school assignment, even though this would result in
a very large number of factually segregated schools.
In 1971, the Supreme Court resolved this issue and rendered a very
important decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,9 the "busing" case. The Court rejected the "geographic zoning
is neutral" argument.2" It observed that, "all things are not equal in a system
that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial
segregation." 2' As a result, the entire school system was deemed to be de
jure segregated, and the school district was required to desegregate the
entire system to the maximum extent feasible, including where necessary,
by busing African-American students to formerly white schools and white
by President Carter in 1980 as the first African-American judge of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Judge Cahill took Senior Status in 1992. He
passed away in 2004, coinciding with the 50th Anniversary of Brown.
17. Davis v. Bd. of Educ. of Charleston, 216 F. Supp. 295, 300 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
18. See JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 761-65
(7th ed. 2004) (discussingthe post-Brown litigation); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The
Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970: A History andAnalysis , 64
VA. L. REV. 485 (1978).
19. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
20. Id. at 28.
21. Id.
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students to formerly African-American schools. 2 The busing order would
include schools that had been constructed after Brown, since they were a
part of what was still a de jure segregated school system.2 3 Thus,
desegregation would be required in all of the urban school districts in the
south, and again white parents could avoid desegregation only by enrolling
their children in segregated private schools.
Whenever the Supreme Court decides a major case, it thereby provides
a precedent that lawyers can use in other cases. Swann now made it
possible to bring a new round of desegregation suits in all the urban school
districts that were segregated by state law pre-Brown in order to "achieve
the great possible degree of actual segregation." 4 At the time of Swann,
I was teaching at the University of Kentucky. As a volunteer lawyer for the
Kentucky ACLU, I brought a suit on behalf of African-American and white
parents against the school system in Lexington-Fayette County, where the
University was located. The Fayette County school system had closed the
one African-American high school after Brown and assigned the African-
American students to the formerly white high schools. But it continued to
use geographic attendance zoning for the junior high and elementary
schools, which meant that most of them were factually segregated schools.
In fight of Swann, we could now argue that Fayette County was still
operating an unconstitutional dual school system. The court agreed, and a
court-ordered desegregation plan went into effect in the fall of 1972.25 That
was the easy case.
The much more difficult case involved Louisville and Jefferson County,
which had the largest African-American population in the state. Most of the
African-American population resided in the City of Louisville. In 1972,
Louisville was a separate school district, with about 50,000 students, over
half of whom were African-American. While the Louisville district
desegregated somewhat after Brown, it did not do much, and in 1972 most
22. Id. at 15-16, 26-31.
23. Id. at 20-21. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (holding that
until the system had been fully desegregated and unitary status had been achieved, the school
authorities had the affirmative duty not to take any action that had the effect of increasing
or perpetuating segregation); see also United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407
U.S. 484 (1972). Thus, the school board could not construct any schools that opened as a
racially identifiable school or permit any other school to become racially identifiable.
24. Swann, 402 U.S. at 26.
25. Jefferson v. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County, Ky., 344 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ky.
1972).
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of its schools were still factually segregated. The larger, suburban Jefferson
County school district had about 100,000 students, only 4% of whom were
African-American. It operated one combined elementary-junior high school
for its African-American students. In addition, pre-Brown, the school bused
its African-American high school students to Central High School,
Louisville's pre-Brown African-American high school. I led a team of
lawyers in an ACLU-NAACP-Kentucky Commission on Civil Rights joint
venture in which we filed two suits on behalf of African-American and
white parents residing in both districts. In 1973, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which covers Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and
Tennessee, ruled that both systems were de jure segregated. 6 It also
ordered that the desegregation plan cross school district lines, so that there
would be cross-district busing between the African-American schools in
Louisville and the white schools in Jefferson County.27 As I will discuss
shortly, the same kind of cross-district busing order had been issued in the
Detroit desegregation case.28
While school desegregation was tortuously being implemented in the
southern and border states in the 1960s, the lawyers for the NAACP and
other civil rights groups also looked at the situation in metropolitan areas
outside the south, such as Detroit, where the overwhelming number of
schools were in fact racially segregated. While much of this segregation
was due to the use of geographic attendance zoning interacting with
patterns of racial residential segregation and concentration, not all of it was.
Rather, the civil rights lawyers contended that the school districts built on
these patterns of racial residential segregation and concentration to
maximize school segregation and bring about the existence of a large
number of racially segregated schools instead of racially integrated schools.
If a policy of intentional racial segregation could be shown, the resulting
segregation of the schools was de jure and unconstitutional in the same
manner as segregation required by state law in the southern and border
states pre-Brown.
This policy of segregation could be inferred from a pattern of
26. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County, Ky., 489 F.2d 925
(6th Cir. 1973), vacatedand remanded, 418 U.S, 918(1974), reinstated, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th
Cir. 1974).
27. NewburgArea Council, Inc., 489 F.2d at 932.
28. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F.Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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discretionary decisions made by school authorities. These decisions included
the drawing of attendance zones, the setting up of optional zones, school
construction and school closure, and teacher assignment, which maximized
racial segregation and brought about racially segregated schools instead of
racially integrated schools. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the courts
were finding that segregative intent was present in case after case on the
grounds that (1) the discretionary decisions of the school authorities showed
a pattern of maximizing racial segregation and causing schools to become
racially identifiable and (2) these decisions could not be explained
consistently in terms of racially neutral criteria or the criteria that the school
authorities purportedly were applying.29 One of the leading cases involved
the Pontiac school district, with the case presided over by then United
States District Judge Damon Keith.30 Judge Keith found that the school
officials "intentionally utilized the power at their disposal to locate new
schools and arrange boundaries in such a way as to perpetuate the pattern
of segregation within the city and thereby, deliberately, in contradiction of
their announced policies of achieving a racial mixture in the schools,
prevented integration."' When the school board gave reasons for its
discretionary decisions, Judge Keith found that these reasons were not
consistent with each other or with the purportedly neutral criteria that the
school board was applying. 2 Judge Keith thus found a policy of
segregation,33 and ordered the school board to desegregate the system.34 In
affirming Judge Keith, the Sixth Circuit stated that the school board's
29. See generally Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and School Desegregation: An
Inquiry into the Nature of the Substantive Right, 68 KY. L.J. 879, 891-915 (1979-1980)
(discussion and review of cases).
30. Davis v. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich 1970), aff'd, 443
F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1973).
31. Davis, 309 F. Supp. at 741.
32. For example, while the Board purportedly had a policy against building small
schools, it erected a new all-whiteelementary school with 167 students, the smallest in the
system, rather than send the white students to a new all-black school. Similarly, when a
black school became overcrowded, the Board erected a new black school to handle the
overflow, although there was excess capacity at a nearby white school. Id.
33. As he stated: "Where a Board of Education has contributed and played a major role
in the development and growth of a segregated situation, the Board is guilty of de jure
segregation. The fact that such came slowly and surreptitiously rather than by legislative
pronouncement makes the situation no less evil." Id. at 742.
34. Id. at 745.
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decisions "more often than not tended to perpetuate segregation," and that
any attempt to justify those decisions in terms of purportedly neutral criteria
would usually require "inconsistent applications of these criteria." 35 The
same policy of segregation was found in Detroit, Lansing, Kalamazoo and
Benton Harbor,36 and was found in many school districts outside of the
south. 37 Since these districts were de jure segregated school systems, they
were, like school districts in the South, required to desegregate to the
maximum extent feasible, including "busing" where necessary.38
However, in order to achieve actual desegregation in these school
systems, there had to be a sufficient number of white students in the system
to integrate with the African-American students. By 1970, there had been
a substantial movement of white families from urban school districts to
neighboring suburban school districts. It was believed, quite correctly, that
if school desegregation was required in an urban school district alone, this
would hasten "white flight" to the adjoining suburban school districts, leaving
no whites left to integrate. In 1970, when the Detroit litigation was instituted,
the Detroit school system was nearly 64% African-American.39 Therefore,
a desegregation plan limited to the Detroit school system alone would
produce only a limited degree of actual desegregation, and even that would
likely decline in the face of "white flight" to the suburbs.40 To prevent this
from happening, a District Judge ordered a desegregation plan that crossed
school district lines and provided for busing between the African-American
schools in Detroit and the white schools in the nearby suburbs.41 The Sixth
35. Davis, 443 F.2d at 576.
36. See NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir. 1977); Oliver v.
Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974); Berry v. Sch. Dist. of City of
Benton Harbor, Mich., 505 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1974).
37. See Sedler, supra note 29, at 896-97.
38. See, e.g. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S.
189 (1973).
39. See Robert A. Sedler, The Profound Impact ofMilliken v. Bradley, 33 WAYNE L.
REv. 1693, 1705 (1987) (discussing the increasing racial residential segregation and
concentration in Detroit and the Detroit Public Schools as of 1970); see also Reynolds
Farley, Population Trends and School Segregation in the Detroit Metropolitan Area, 21
WAYNE L. REV. 867 (1975).
40. See Sedler, supra note 39; Farley, supra note 39.
41. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd inpart, vacated in
part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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Circuit held that this cross-district busing was permissible,42 and ordered
similar cross-district busing between Louisville and Jefferson County.4 3
However, in the 1974 case of Milliken v. Bradley,' the Supreme
Court held in a 5-4 decision, that the cross-district busing between Detroit
and the suburbs was not constitutionally permissible. The Court took the
position that since the constitutional violation had occurred only in the
Detroit school district, the remedy for that violation had to be limited to
Detroit.4 5 A Detroit-only desegregation plan was implemented, the predicted
white flight occurred, and for some time now the Detroit school system has
been approximately 90% African-American.46
In the Louisville-Jefferson County case, the Supreme Court ordered the
Sixth Circuit to reconsider its cross-district desegregation order in light of
Milliken.47 I managed to prevail on the remand, primarily because both the
Louisville and Jefferson County districts practiced de jure segregation, and
because they had a history of cooperation pre-Brown.8 At that point, the
Louisville district decided to "go out of business," as it was permitted to do
under Kentucky law.49 The Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and
42. Bradley, 484 F.2d at 249.
43. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson County, Ky., 489 F.2d
925 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, reinstated, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
44. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
45. Id. at 744-45.
46. See Sedler, supra note 39, at 1703-1709 (discussing the situation prevailing in the
Detroit Public Schools as of 1987). The situation prevailing in the Detroit Public Schools
today is substantially the same as it was at that time.
47. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County,Ky. v. NewburgArea Council, Inc., 418 U.S. 918
(1974).
48. NewburgArea Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson County, Kentucky, 510
F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); see also Robert A. Sedler,
Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken--On Losing Big Battles and Winning
Small Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 593-601(1975)
(discussing the arguments in the case on remand).
49. The provisions of Kentucky law establishing the county as the basic educational
unit and providing for the merger or consolidation of the Jefferson County and Louisville
school districts were set out by the Sixth Circuit in its remand opinion. Newburg Area
Council, 510 F.2d at 360. Shortly after the Sixth Circuit's remand decision, the Louisville
School District initiated a petition for unconditional merger with the Jefferson County
School District, which was approved by the State Board of Education. See the discussion
in Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation, supra note 48, at 599-600.
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the countywide desegregation plan in the now merged system went into
effect at the start of the 1975 school year. 50 At that time, the countywide
African-American school population was about 20%.1' The elementary
schools were integrated in a range of between 12 and 44% African-
American, and the secondary schools at a range between 14 and 24%.52
There was great resistance at first. For example, the Kentucky National
Guard had to be called out to prevent violence and literally rode shotgun on
the buses. However, in time the community accepted the idea of
desegregation, the school system worked hard to implement the plan, the
academic performance of both African-American and white students
improved,53 and the basic structure of the plan remains in effect today. 4
50. Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538 (6thCir. 1976) (setting out and approving
the desegregation plan).
51. See Sedler, supra note 39, at 1710-20.
52. Id. at 1710.
53. Id. at 1718.
54. The Jefferson County Board of Education has made the policy decision to establish
racial composition guidelines for each of the schools so that the schools can continue to be
racially integrated. The history of the implementation of the original plan and the Board's
actions in the succeeding years are set forth in Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
72 F. Supp.2d 753, 755-769 (W.D. Ky. 1999). The Board has replaced the mandatory
busing of the original decree with a combination of "clustered" and "satellite" attendance
zoning, school choice, and magnet schools. Hampton, 72 F. Supp.2d at 755-769. Under the
guidelines, the goal is that each school shall have between 15% and 50% African-American
students (the current African-American enrollment in the system is approximately 30%).
Id. In that case, the court held that the original decree permitted the Board to use the
guidelines to prevent the re-emergence of racially identifiable schools. Id. However, the court
subsequently held one year later that the decree should be dissolved and that the racial quota
provisions of the guidelines could not be used to deny admission on the basis of race to
magnet schools, since this would have the effect of excluding a student from the special
benefits provided by those schools. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F.
Supp.2d 358 (W.D. Ky. 2000). At the same time it held that the guidelines could be used
as a means of desegregating the regular schools, noting that, "voluntary maintenance of the
desegregated school system should be considered a compelling state interest." Id. at 379. A
challenge to the continuing use of the racial guidelines brought by white parents whose
children were denied admission to certain schools is pending. See Chris Kenning, School
Officials Say They Fear Resegregation in the System, LOUISVILLE COURIER JOURNAL,
December 11, 2003, at lB.
It is interesting to note that the challenges to the Board's racial guidelines were first
brought by African-American parents whose children were excluded from Central High
School, the pre-Brown black high school that had now been converted to a magnet schools.
[Vol. 50:835
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Similarly, in Lexington-Fayette County, the community accepted
desegregation, and the basic structure of the plan remains in effect today.5
As a result, according to a recent study by the Harvard University Civil
Rights Project, today Kentucky leads the Nation in school integration, with
80.9% of its African-American students in majority white schools and
virtually none in 90-100% African-American schools.56 In Michigan, by
contrast, only 18% of the African-American students are in majority white
schools, while 62.7% are in 90-100% African-American schools.57 The
Since they were successful in their suit and the racial guidelines were eliminated, Central has
now become a predominantly African-American school and to that extent has returned to its
pre-Brown composition. See Greg Winter, Long After Brown v. Board of Education, Sides
Switch, NEW YORK TIMES, May 16, 2004, at 27.
55. However, the Fayette County Board, unlike the Jefferson County Board, has not
tried to maintain racial guidelines, with the result that some of the elementary schools are
predominantly African-American, in a school system that is 23% African-American.
African-Americans compose40% or more of the student population at 21 of the 50 schools.
Still, there is a much greater degree of desegregation today that there was in 1972, when the
suit was filed. See Linda B. Blackford, Fayette Disparity Exists Despite '70s Lawsuit Win,
LEXiNGTON HERALD-LEADER, May 16, 2004, at A13.
56. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWNAT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S
NIGHTMARE 29-31 (Harvard University 2004).
57. Id. at 27. In commenting on the situation in Kentucky, the authors state:
Kentucky stands out in the list of the most integrated states for black students.
It was a state with a history of de jure segregation and experienced a bitter struggle
over the initiation of desegregation in metropolitan Louisville nearly 30 years ago.
Most of the segregated black students in the state were in the city school district,
which had a substantial majority of black students. Rather than follow the typical
practice, after the Detroit decision, of limiting desegregation to a decliningdistrict
where desegregation would be limited and short-lived, the Louisville school board
voted to go out of existence and, under state law, had to be absorbed into the
Jefferson County school district, which contained the city's suburbs. The federal
judge hearing the desegregation case, with the support of the state's human rights
commission, ordered full and immediate desegregation of the resultingmetropolitan
district. After a period of deep conflict the situation settled down and the district
began to move from mandatory reassignment to choice and clustering systems
emphasizing both educational options and desegregation. When increasingly
conservative high court decisions made it difficult for school districts which were
no longer under court order to continue race-conscious desegregation policies,
Jefferson County returned to federal court to fight for its right to remain integrated
and won.
Id. at 31.
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extent of actual school desegregation in many other states with a substantial
African-American population unfortunately is closer to that in Michigan than
to that in Kentucky. 8 One of the factors contributing to this situation is that
practically all of the court orders requiring desegregation have now been set
aside on the ground that the school districts have eliminated all vestiges of
state-imposed segregation and are now free to return to geographic
attendance zoning. 9 Many have done so. As previously stated, because of
patterns of racial residential concentration and segregation, geographic
attendance zoning will produce a large number of factually segregated
schools within a school district. And, in the major metropolitan areas, such
as Detroit, there is typically an urban school district that is predominantly
African-American and lower-income, surrounded by the predominantly
white and middle and upper-income suburban districts.6" As Justice
Marshall prophesied in his dissent in Milliken, the effect of the decision has
been to "allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two
cities--one white, the other black."'
We see then that the education component of Brown has been to
establish a constitutional right on the part of African-American and white
schoolchildren to attend school in a school system in which there exists no
vestiges of state-imposed segregation. There is no constitutional right to
58. According to the Harvard University Civil Rights Project, the percentage of
African-American students in 50-100% minority schools by region as of 2001 was as
follows:
South 69.8%
Border 67.9%
Northeast 78.4%
Midwest 72.9%
West 75.8%
The percentage of African-American students in 90-100% minority schools by region as of
2001 was as follows:
South 31.0%
Border 41.6%
Northeast 51.2%
Midwest 46.8%
West 30.0%
Id. at 20.
59. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub.
Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
60. Sedler, supra note 35, at 1703-07.
61. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 815 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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attend schools that are in fact desegregated.62 There is a substantial amount
of actual segregation in public education today, and it is the result of
patterns of racial residential segregation and concentration, interacting with
geographic attendance zoning and separate urban and suburban school
districts. Lawyers have done what they could to prevent the operation of
racially segregated schools, but as this example indicates, there are limits to
just how far lawyers can go in using the Constitution to bring about societal
social change.
But now, as I end, let me come back to the core meaning of Brown.
Brown stands as a monument as to how lawyers have used their ability and
their commitment to social justice to bring crashing down the system of
state-imposed segregation and discrimination that for so long had afflicted
African-Americans in the American south. No longer in this nation can
there be racial inequality imposed by law. This, in the final analysis, is the
enduring legacy of Brown.
62. Sedler, supra note 28, at 916-26.
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